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Abstract
In 2010 the Louisiana legislature adopted the Louisiana Granting Resources and
Autonomies for Diplomas (GRAD) Act, a statewide performance-based funding policy designed
to improve performance among public colleges. This study, utilizing data collected from the
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) on 15 two-year public colleges over
eight years, applied Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression to retention rates, graduation
rates, and degree productivity. Results suggest that the introduction of the policy had little
immediate effect on overall institutional performance; however, there were some modest
increases in long-term certificate productivity. Additionally, there were significant improvements
in data quality throughout higher education after the introduction of the policy.

Keywords: performance funding; higher education; GRAD Act; Louisiana
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Introduction
Funding for higher education in Louisiana has never been robust. In fact, it wasn't until
the 2007-2008 fiscal year that the state finally caught up to the Southern regional average in per
student funding (Blum 2010b; Public Affairs Research Council, Inc. 2008). Unfortunately soon
after, the state suffered one economic blow after another: the 2008 recession hit, newly
implemented tax breaks caused income tax revenues to shrink, and Hurricane Katrina recovery
funds and federal stimulus dollars began running out and/or expiring (Ballard 2010; Blum 2011;
Russell 2016). Postsecondary institutions in Louisiana faced a unique dilemma. They not only
had to contend with dwindling state support for higher education, as many states had been
dealing with for several years, but they were also not able to generate new revenue since
Louisiana requires a two-thirds legislative approval to increase tuition, the only state in the
Union to do so (Blum 2010a).
By 2010, state support for colleges and universities had fallen almost 20%, with
additional cuts looming on the horizon (Blum 2010a). Since the colleges were not in a position
to cover the losses of the state allocation by raising tuition on their own, they were forced to
depend on the governor to help fill the budget holes. During the regular legislative session,
Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal attempted to address the current budget climate of reduced
funds for higher education by backing House Bill 1171. The bill, later Act 741, resulted in the
Louisiana Granting Resources and Autonomies for Diplomas (GRAD) Act. The GRAD Act,
signed into law in June 2010, instituted performance measures for the colleges that, if met,
allowed them to increase their own tuition by up to 10% per year. Additionally, this newly
created performance-based funding formula tied 15% of a college’s overall state funding to
meeting the GRAD Act goals (Addo 2012).
Although similar performance-based funding policies had been implemented in states
such as California, Florida, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington
with limited success, several influential organizations, many powerful state leaders, and the
1

public were in favor of having colleges’ budgets tied to performance, obviously believing that
doing so would increase graduation rates and make the colleges more accountable (Blum
2010b; Hillman 2016; Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2014; Shuler 2010). Groups such as
Blueprint Louisiana, Public Affairs Research Council, and GNO, Inc. touted the policy as the
remedy to Louisiana’s pitiable graduation rates. At the time, Louisiana colleges graduated only
38% of first-time, full-time bachelor degree students within six years, second-to-last in the
Southern region (Blum 2010c). The colleges, specifically, were interested in gaining the
autonomy to raise their own tuition, believing it to be a way to cure the ills of the recent state
budget cuts (Blum 2010b; Addo 2013c). In due course, the Board of Regents signed six-year
agreements with individual institutions in which they committed to meeting specific performance
objectives in exchange for authority to increase tuition up to 10% for the following academic
year.
However, public opinion quickly turned. In a letter to the editor, one educator made clear
that he felt the whole scheme was a farce and that it was simply “an attempt to give the
appearance of reform to an ideological agenda that consisted of little more than removing
hundreds of millions of dollars from a higher education system that already was drastically
underfunded” (Striffler 2012). Soon, the colleges also became disgruntled. Apparently, the
reporting process alone consisted of almost 52 different performance benchmarks (Addo 2012).
The hurried implementation of the Act and the associated tedious reporting requirements, a
common complaint amongst institutions in states with performance-based funding policies,
resulted in state auditors finding much of the colleges’ data fraught with errors (Addo 2012;
Lipinkski 2014; The Advocate 2013). In fact, the first audit of GRAD Act data in 2012 revealed
13 out of the 32 undergraduate institutions reviewed had submitted data that were ‘not
sufficiently reliable’ (Louisiana Legislative Auditor 2012).
The crux of the problem was that the colleges were not actually benefiting from all of the
extra work. It seemed that the Act was not about increasing performance or autonomy, but
2

about mediating cuts to higher education imposed by the state. Evidence of this can be seen as
early as 2010 when in response to questions by state lawmakers on the true state of higher
education funding, the governor’s office asserted that the overall funding for colleges and/or
universities had only been slashed by five percent because tuition hikes resulting from colleges
meeting the GRAD Act minimum requirements filled the gaps created by the most recent budget
cuts (Ballard 2010). This trend of replacing state appropriation funding with increased tuition and
fees continued. Since 2009, postsecondary institutions in Louisiana have seen their portion of
core revenue from state appropriations fall 30% while their percentage of net revenue from
tuition and fees grow 97% (see figure 1).

Figure 1: 2006-2015 % of Core Revenue--State Appropriations versus Tuition & Fees
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As the 2016-2017 fiscal year marks the sixth and final year of the initial agreements
between the Board of Regents and the colleges, it seems a fortuitous time at which to examine
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what effect this experiment in performance-based funding had on higher education in Louisiana.
So far, we know that the colleges saw their tuition increases swallowed up by additional cuts in
state funding--essentially making them a wash--and students, over the last five years, had their
tuition and mandatory fees increase faster than in any other state (Millhollon and Addo 2013;
Russell 2016). Obviously, a deeper examination of the effects of the Act is required to discover
if colleges were able to improve performance, as had been portrayed as the original purpose of
the Act, or if it had simply been political rhetoric in order to stave off complaints about funding.
Through this study, I attempt to examine not only if institutions improved performance, but also
what external factors may have contributed to their gains and/or losses.
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Literature Review
Performance-based funding has existed for the better part of a century. It began when
an amendment to the National Security Act of 1949 introduced performance budgeting to the
U.S. military. The policy was quickly expanded, through the Budget and Accounting Procedures
Act of 1950, to include all federal civilian governmental agencies (Jordan and Hackbart 1999;
McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006). Researchers contend that governments use this method
of funding, predicated on meeting certain performance measures, to influence behavior and
pressure institutions to be more accountable, efficient, and productive in the use of publicly
generated funds (Alexander 2000; Bogue and Johnson 2010; Burke and Associates 2002;
Dougherty et al. 2011; Fryar 2011; Layzell 1998; Liefner 2003). The reliance on performance
outcomes would imply that there is a “massive effort to reform government to become more
rational, professional, democratic, authoritative, and honest” (Miller, Robbins, and Keum 2007,
473). Purportedly hoping to achieve the same ends, a majority of state-level agencies, including
higher education, likewise adopted the system.
However, many argue that performance-based funding is a much more complicated
issue and that other factors including politics, the economy, and timing all play a significant role
in a state’s decision to adopt the program (Burke and Minassians 2003; McLendon, Hearn, and
Deaton 2006; McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher 2009; Melkers and Willoughby 1998; Tandberg
2009; Tandberg and Griffith 2013). Actually, some question whether these ‘reforms’ are only
symbolic and are instead simply a way in which to manipulate the budget process (Fryar 2011;
Liefner 2003; Miller, Robbins, and Keum 2007; Rabovsky 2012). In fact, “although most states
claim both public accountability and institutional improvement as purposes of performance
funding, in some, increased funding seems a critical, although usually unannounced, motive”
(Serban and Burke 1998, 160).
The use of performance-based funding (PBF) in higher education began in 1978 when
“the State of Tennessee first addressed systemized accountability by establishing a series of
5

performance or incentive funding initiatives that began shaping a portion of the higher education
funding structure based on measurable outcomes” (Alexander 2000, 420). This experiment
opened the door for other states to implement their own versions in which achievement of
performance measures was directly tied to specific amounts of funding (Burke and Minassians
2003; D’Amico et al 2014; Friedel et al. 2013). In the early to mid-1990s this funding model, now
referred to as PBF 1.0, was expanded to states such as Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and South Carolina with varying degrees of success. In fact,
Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, and others quickly either ceased the program
altogether or completely revamped it (Burke and Associates 2002; Dougherty and Natow 2009;
Friedel et al. 2013; Hermes 2012; Miao 2012). In the PBF 1.0 model, performance funding
existed as bonuses or incentives awarded on top of the usual enrollment-based state funding.
Most of these models concentrated on the use of outcome measures such as degrees awarded,
graduation rates, and time to degree completion with little regard for differences between or
among types of institutions (Dougherty et al. 2011; D’Amico et al. 2014; Friedel et al. 2013;
Serban and Burke 1998). In most cases, both four-year and two-year schools were held to
similar, if not the same, performance indicators.
Recently, budgetary constraints and the expanding appeal of accountability have
renewed interest in performance-based funding (Dougherty and Reddy 2011; Hermes 2012;
Kelly and Jones 2007; Rabovsky 2012; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014). After years of
insufficient gains under PBF 1.0, many states have moved toward an updated model, so called
PBF 2.0, in which the focus has been shifted to include intermediate measures of success as
relates to the mission of individual institutions. Indicators like retention rates, transfers, and
course completions have been included alongside two-year specific measures such as postgraduate job placement, transfer articulation agreements, and success in remedial course
progressions (Bogue and Johnson 2010; D’Amico et al. 2014; Dougherty et al. 2011; Friedel et
al. 2013; Mangan 2015). With PBF 2.0, funds are now tied to actual state allocations wherein
6

which schools that do not meet their required performance levels can be penalized with a
reduction in state-level funding.
By the beginning of 2016, at least 30 states had instituted some form of performancebased funding for higher education (Mangan 2015; Supriano 2016). Past research has indicated
that performance-based funding is predicated on the belief that in times of scarce resources
institutions will alter their behavior in order to increase resource acquisition. If this were true,
then it would intuitively follow that providing colleges additional financial incentives based on
increased performance during times of economic constraint would result in institutional
improvements (D’Amico, et. al. 2014; Schmidt 2002; Titus 2006). In other words, we would
expect to see increases in student outcomes. Unfortunately, research has not shown this to be
the case (Hillman 2016).
Much of the research related to performance-based funding policies has concentrated
on their impact on graduation rates, retention, and degree completions. These studies have
tended to rely upon several types of comparative research methods in investigating the
effectiveness of these policies. Some have utilized a difference-in-differences Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimation strategy to compare student performance changes over time in the
treatment group (states/institutions effected by PBF policies) to changes over time in the control
group (states/institutions not effected by PBF policies) while others have employed Hierarchical
Linear Modeling (HLM) to explore performance growth patterns in states with PBF against those
without. These panel data analysis methods assist the researcher in evaluating whether
improvements in performance by the treatment group can be attributed specifically to the
implemented policy or if some other reason is behind the change. Several recent studies using
these techniques have found that PBF policies have not positively impacted graduation rates at
four-year institutions (Fryar 2011; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011;
Shin 2010; Shin and Milton 2004). Other national and some state-level (Tennessee and
Washington) studies conducted on retention found similar results at both four-year and two-year
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schools (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and
Hunter 2011). However, there have been more varied findings related to degree completions.
While no increase in bachelor degree productivity has been found (Hillman, Tandberg, and
Gross 2014; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015), some
impact on associate degree and certificate completions at two-year institutions have been
discovered (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015; Tandberg, Hillman, and Barakat 2015). After
the implementation of performance-based funding policies, some states have seen gains,
though delayed, in associate degree and short-term certificate attainment.
While recent research on performance-based funding has not shown that opportunities
for increased resources directly equal improved student outcomes, there have been some
findings that the model has led to enhancements in other areas. Although evidence was
minimal, Rabovsky (2012) discovered that those institutions subject to performance funding
requirements were more likely to prioritize spending toward instruction. One of the most lauded
benefits of the introduction of performance-based funding has been the change in focus of
conversation and institutional efforts away from simply increasing enrollment to improving
outcomes (D’Amico et al. 2014; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Mangan 2015; Sanford
and Hunter 2011). Under these models, colleges are required to prepare and report on
performance measures; thus, providing transparency within the institution and the community.
These documents can be used as internal tools for administrators and faculty in decisionmaking and strategic planning and/or as external tools for students and public officials in
evaluating institutional performance and responsiveness to regional workforce needs.
Some have suggested that it is not the model itself that should be blamed for the
lackluster performance results but instead the minimal amount of funding to which it is tied
(Layzell 1998; Miao 2012). This common flaw is supposedly a reason why performance funding
has not made the level of impact touted as possible by its proponents. As Burke and Associates
(2002) acknowledged, “campus leaders will support programs that may produce more money,
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but their enthusiasm wanes when the funding falls below expectations” (226). Enough funding
must be at risk to incentivize colleges to alter behaviors and change long-standing systems
(Burke and Associates 2002; Hermes 2012; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Layzell 1998;
Maio 2012; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011). Unfortunately, the
perfect level of funding at which motivation kicks in is unknown.
During the almost forty years in which performance-based funding has been in
existence, funding levels have varied anywhere from 1% to 100% (D’Amico et al. 2014; Friedel
et al. 2013; Maio 2012; Schmidt 2002). On average, higher education performance-based
funding, whether in the form of bonuses or portions of state allocations, has hovered around five
percent (Mangan 2015; Sanford and Hunter 2011; Supriano 2016). When Tennessee first
began its program in the late 1970s, funding consisted of a two percent budget supplement. By
2005, when the state switched away from a traditional PBF 1.0 model to the more progressive
PBF 2.0 version, the budget supplement had only reached a high of 5.45% (Sanford and Hunter
2011). In their in-depth study on the impacts of performance funding in Tennessee, Sanford and
Hunter (2011) tried to discern whether this increase in the level of funding had motivated
institutions enough to do more to advance student success. They found no substantial changes
in institutional behavior or performance. They concluded that an amount greater than 5.45%
was needed to increase outcomes. Amazingly, even in states with well established programs
such as Washington and Pennsylvania, state allocation funds tied to performance max out at
one percent and eight percent, respectively, although researchers, in both cases, have found
that these amounts were not enough to produce significant results (Hillman, Tandberg, and
Fryar 2015; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014). More recently, there have been efforts in
states such as Louisiana (15%) and Arkansas (25%) to increase performance funding to a more
meaningful level (Callaway 2012; Friedel et al. 2013).
At the other end of the spectrum, several states have moved to tie almost all of their
higher education funding to performance. One of the first states to experiment with this model
9

was South Carolina. In 1996, legislation was instituted that required 100% of a school’s state
allocation be based on meeting specific benchmarks (Schmidt 2002). This experiment was
quickly abandoned after only two years, having only managed to reach a maximum level of 38%
in just one of those years (Dougherty et al. 2011). This failure did not stop others like Ohio and
Tennessee from establishing similar performance models. Both now require up to 80% of higher
education state funding be based entirely on meeting certain performance levels (Friedel et al
2013). Unfortunately, not enough time has elapsed since these more extreme performancebased funding policies were implemented for studies to have been conducted on their impacts.
Several researchers have cautioned against this rush toward putting such a large
percentage of state funding at risk. Although many agree that funding levels should be enough
to incentivize institutions to increase performance, some worry about creating an unstable
funding system in which basic services are in jeopardy and long-term planning is impossible
(Dougherty and Reddy 2011; Hermes 2012; Maio 2012; Shin and Milton 2004). In actuality,
almost all of the state-level performance-based policies contain stopgap measures to prevent
any wild fluctuations in funding. Examples of these safeguards include employing hold-harmless
clauses that guarantee a minimum amount of base funding each year, utilizing three year rolling
averages to prevent any one year of down performance from disrupting operations, and setting
benchmarks at levels that are easily reachable (Dougherty et al. 2014; Rabovsky 2012;
Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015). The risk faced by schools is reduced even further by
the fact that, in most states, the current percent of core revenue institutions received from state
funding is shrinking (Alexander 2000; Dougherty et al. 2011; Dougherty et al. 2014; Tandberg
and Griffith 2013; Titus 2006). These seemingly large percentages actually end up having
minimal impact on annual budgets. Furthermore, states have been hesitant to enforce the
punitive powers allowable under their performance-based funding policies (Dougherty et al.
2011; Jordan and Hackbart 1999; McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher 2009; Tandberg 2009).
Legislators are very aware of the political risks if they defund a prized institution or one with
10

powerful supporters. Seemingly, the effects of these policies have been mitigated to have little
to no real consequences.

11

Theoretical Expectations
The real question remains, to what extent does performance-based funding actually
impact institutional performance? The available empirical work provides limited theoretical
guidance on which to build hypotheses. We know that studies have found no evidence of
increased graduation rates at bachelor degree granting institutions in states with performancebased funding policies (Fryar 2011; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011;
Shin 2010; Shin and Milton 2004). Regrettably, since no similar studies have been conducted
on graduation rates at two-year schools, we have no indication of whether the policy has
comparable effects on associate degree granting institutions. Likewise, research has found that
performance funding has had no positive impact on student persistence or retention rates at
either four-year or two-year institutions (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015; Rutherford and
Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011). However, recent studies on performance funding
and degree completions have begun to yield more varied results. While bachelor degree
productivity has not grown, there has been some evidence of increases in associate degrees
and short-term certificates in states with performance funding (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar
2015; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Tandberg, Hillman,
and Barakat 2015; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015). Unfortunately, these results have
only been found in single state case studies so their generalizability is limited.
While most studies concentrate on the limited impact that these funding policies have on
increasing institutional effectiveness, some showcase which aspects of policy design have
helped to produce the greatest benefit. The most successful policies offer opportunities for
adequate input from related stakeholders, differentiate measures between and among two- and
four-year colleges in consideration of their diverse missions, set reasonable benchmarks, and
provide sufficient funding and guidance to assist institutions in building the organizational
capacity needed to increase performance (Burke, Modarresi and Serban 1999; D’Amico et al.
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2014; Dougherty et al. 2011; Friedel et al. 2013; Schmidt 2002; Serban and Burke 1998; Shin
2010; Titus 2006; Whissemore 2012).
As research continues to be conducted on performance-based funding, I have to ask
myself what I can contribute to the ever-growing literature. As Serban and Burke (1998) declare,
longitudinal studies of institutional performance are the best devices for understanding
performance-funding effectiveness. I believe that an examination of the GRAD Act provides this
opportunity. The case of performance-based funding in Louisiana is unique. Not only did the
GRAD Act tie 15% of a college’s state allocation to performance, it also gave schools the
autonomy to raise tuition up to 10% without prior approval from the legislature. Previous studies
on performance-based funding have not considered this added incentive as a factor in
determining the effectiveness of these policies. Additionally, this study will be one of the first to
explore the relationship between performance-based funding and graduation rates at two-year
institutions. Through this analysis of measures related to institutional effectiveness, I may be
able to draw some conclusions as to whether the GRAD Act accomplished its stated intentions
of improving higher education performance. Prior research detailing the limited impact of
performance-based funding policies and the perceived design flaws of the legislation,
specifically the absence of adequate funding to build organizational capacity, lead me to
hypothesize that the GRAD Act did not increase the overall effectiveness of Louisiana’s public
post-secondary two-year institutions. I do not expect to find any improvements in graduation
rate, retention, or associate degree completions, but I do anticipate some gains in short-term
certificates as these provide schools with the simultaneous benefit of helping to meet award
productivity benchmarks and increasing revenue.
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Research Design
Hearn (2006), in an essay prepared for the 2006 National Postsecondary Education
Cooperative Symposium, observed that early studies of performance-based funding relied on
simple descriptive and/or correlational analyses. He suggested that in the future, researchers
and policymakers should try to “untangle what is merely artefactual and what is truly an effect of
some program or policy” (17). Recently, we have seen an increase in quantitative studies such
as those by Shin (2010); Sanford and Hunter (2011); Fryar (2011); Rabovsky (2012); Hillman,
Tandberg, and Gross (2014); Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar (2015); and Umbricht, Fernandez,
and Ortagus (2015) that aim to understand not only if the presence of a performance-based
funding model improves institutional effectiveness, but also what external factors may intercede.
In contrast to many previous studies conducted at the macro-level (state or national); Hillman,
Tandberg, and Fryar (2015) reveal that utilizing a micro-level approach in studying the Student
Achievement Initiative in Washington allowed them to explore more deeply how the
performance-based funding policy impacted individual institutions. I believe that the same
approach is appropriate for studying the GRAD Act.
It is important to note, “quality--the hallmark of higher education--is an elusive and
subjective attribute that is seldom easy to assess objectively and always difficult to measure
quantitatively” (Burke and Associates 2002, 40). In evaluating performance relative to the GRAD
Act requirements, the Louisiana Board of Regents utilized common measures based on student
success, articulation and transfer, workforce and economic development, and efficiency. Some
of the specific indicators included first to second year retention rate, same institution graduate
rate, award productivity, change in program completers, placement rate of graduates, and
number of accredited programs. Over the course of the six-year agreements the type and
weight of indicators utilized in the calculations by the Board of Regents were altered. These
inconsistencies limit the usability of the GRAD Act reports as functional tools of comparability for
the state in evaluating the true impact of the policy. In consideration of this, a string of
14

unflattering data audit reports, and the need for data from before the implementation of the
GRAD Act, I chose to seek out a single source, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
Survey (IPEDS), for the outcome data for my research. IPEDS has routinely been used as a
consistent and reliable source of postsecondary data (Fryar 2011; Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar
2015; Kelly and Jones 2007; Rabovsky 2012; Shin 2010; Shin and Milton 2004).
In this study, institutional effectiveness will be operationalized through three performance
indicators: retention, graduation rate, and award productivity. By including an intermediate
measure (retention) alongside conventional output measures (graduation rate and award
productivity), I hope to expand on the current research dedicated to discovering the level to
which performance-based funding policies impact institutional effectiveness. Specifically, I will
explore how the GRAD Act affected part-time and full-time student retention rates, graduation
rates, the total awards given, and the number of associate degrees and/or certificates conferred
by conducting a longitudinal (panel) time-series analysis based on data from 15 two-year public
undergraduate institutions over eight academic years. This time span includes years from both
before and after the implementation of the GRAD Act. This sub-group of two-year colleges
shares similar, in some cases identical, missions, admission policies, and funding structures.
Additionally, their regional focus will allow me to discover if local demographics and/or the state
of the area public school system affected college performance. Narrowing my research to
concentrate on members of this homogenous group will allow me the opportunity to discover
and draw more general conclusions on how the autonomies granted in the Act impacted this
specific sector of higher education.
The unit of analysis will be institution by academic year. Each school will be categorized
according to its accrediting body: Council on Occupational Education (COE) or Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC). COE adheres to
the mission of “assuring quality and integrity in career and technical education” (Council on
Occupational Education website). This organization accredits schools that seek to expand the
15

portability of skill-based credentials, increase job placement for their graduates, and explore
linkages with business and industry. The mission of SACSCOC is more general in nature. It
prefers to focus on the “enhancement of educational quality…and the improvement of the
effectiveness of institutions by ensuring that they…address the needs of society and students”
(Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges website). Schools
accredited by SACSCOC offer bachelor degrees, associate degrees, certificates, and continuing
education programs as well as curricula that are transferable to other colleges and universities.

Table 1: Institutions Categorized by Accrediting Body
SACSCOC

COE

Baton Rouge Community College

Capital Area Technical College

Bossier Parish Community College

Central La Technical Community College

Delgado Community College

Northshore Technical Community College

Fletcher Technical Community College

Northwest Louisiana Technical College

Louisiana State University-Eunice*

South Central La Technical College

Nunez Community College

SOWELA Technical Community College

River Parishes Community College
South Louisiana Community College
Southern University at Shreveport*
SOWELA Technical Community College**
*Junior colleges. **SOWELA became accredited by SACSCOC in 2014

The Louisiana Community and Technical College System manage all schools within the
study except Louisiana State University-Eunice and Southern University at Shreveport.
Although these institutions are accredited by the same body as community colleges and offer
programs and services normally associated with comprehensive two-year schools, I suspect
that these ‘junior colleges’ may act differently. In order to test this supposition, I will run two
versions of each proposed regression model--one that categorizes these two schools as
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community colleges and one that categorizes them as junior colleges. Any inconsistencies
found may provide evidence that institutions not identified as ‘community colleges’ react
differently to policy changes, at least in this scenario.
Seven measures related to student success will be used to determine institutional
effectiveness: graduation, part-time retention, full-time retention, short-term certificate
productivity, long-term certificate productivity, associate degree productivity, and total awards
productivity (see Appendix A for definitions). The dependent variables for retention and
graduation will be the rates for each as calculated by IPEDS for an academic year. I will apply a
generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects regression model to each measure. Randomeffects GLS is appropriate for longitudinal panel data as it takes into account the correlation that
usually exists between repeated observations on the same subject rather than assuming
independence among all observations. It also allows for estimates to be calculated for important
time-invariant independent variables such as GRAD Act and accrediting body. I employ a
slightly different methodology for award productivity. As the number of awards varies so widely
across years and within categories, I will attempt to standardize the measure by having each
related dependent variable be a dummy variable indicating whether a statistically significant
increase in performance occurred from the previous year (1=Yes, 0=No). I will apply a GLS
logistic regression model to each of the binary dependent variables.
Graduation rate data for the 2008 academic year are unavailable for several institutions
from the New Orleans area. A graduation cohort could not be established for the 2006 academic
year because these institutions were either closed or exempt from the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data Survey (IPEDS) reporting requirement due to Hurricane Katrina. As such, the
graduation rate analysis will begin with the 2009 academic year instead of 2008 as with the
other dependent variables. Additionally, I have chosen to differentiate between the total number
of awards and the total number of associate degrees and short- and long-term certificates
because of recent findings by Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar (2015). They discovered that policy
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changes related to performance-based funding in Washington caused a significant increase in
the number of short-term certificates awarded but not an increase in associate degrees or longterm certificates. In order to understand the true impact of the GRAD Act, I will explore
performance related to these individual outcomes.
The main Independent variable of interest is the GRAD Act. This measure will be a
dummy variable indicating whether the GRAD Act was in effect during a specific academic year
(1=Yes, 0=No). Although the legislation was signed into law in June 2010, institutions were not
required to meet established performance measures until 2011-2012. As such, the 2012
academic year will act as the first year in which the variable will equal 1. Also, variables related
to institutional characteristics will be used as controls. These include full-time equivalent
enrollment, which should mediate any uptick in award productivity simply due to enrollment
increases; full-time and part-time enrollment rate; full-time, part-time, and total white enrollment
percentage; percentage of revenue from tuition & fees; percentage of revenue from state
appropriation; percentage of expenses on instruction; percentage of expenses on
student/academic support; and accrediting body. Evidence suggests that since 2012 the student
body composition at two-year colleges has altered somewhat because increases in admission
requirements and steep tuition hikes have forced many students that would have otherwise
attended four-year universities to enroll at a two-year college (Russell 2016). Since all schools
across the state were simultaneously affected by these student population changes, I am
assuming that this change was random and will not systematically impact the findings. Finally,
as studies by Dougherty, et al. (2016); Kelly and Jones (2007); Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar
(2015); and Rutherford and Rabovsky (2014) have shown, regional socio-economic factors may
also influence institutional performance. This design includes such regional factors as median
household income, white population percentage, and K-12 school district performance score as
additional controls.
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It is important to note that this study has limitations in regards to available data and
breadth of scope. Some of the data in my analysis are based only on full-time, first-time
students. This is unfortunate as there is some discussion that this “emphasis on full-time
students in many of the indicators, probably due to data availability, slights the growing
importance of part-time students, especially in urban institutions and two-year colleges” (Burke
1998, 60). In a 2013 article, University of Louisiana System President Sandra Woodley echoed
this sentiment. She argued that “schools that cater to low-income and so-called non-traditional
students--older and oftentimes holding down full-time jobs--should not be judged using the
same measures as a school that attracts high-achieving, middle-class students straight out of
high schools” (Addo 2013b). An example of this can be found in the current graduation rate data
available from IPEDS. These calculations do not include transfer, returning, or part-time
students. These omissions obviously limit the use of this measure as a true barometer of
institutional effectiveness. However, including these data alongside retention rates and award
productivity should help to create a fuller picture of the performance level of the two-year
institutions included in the study.
Also, it is very likely that an examination of student outcomes other than those included
in this paper could yield very different results. Future research should explore the impact of
alternative performance goals such as job placement rates, number of transfer students, or
changes in program completers. Additionally, inferences to be drawn from this study on the
impact of the GRAD Act on institutional effectiveness are limited by its focus on two-year
institutions and the finite number in each category. This analysis includes only 15 institutions:
six technical colleges, seven community colleges, and two junior colleges. Finally, it may be
possible that other events occurring during the same time as the implementation of the GRAD
Act could have interceded to either augment or disrupt the policy’s effects. Events such as
changes in board leadership, technical college mergers, and continuing state-level budget
struggles may all have played a part in school performance.
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Findings
Institutional Characteristics
I began my analysis by exploring the average values of various institutional
characteristics both before and after the implementation of the GRAD Act. I looked at how these
variables changed when considering all two-year schools as a whole, then by separating them
into three distinct categories: technical colleges, community colleges, and junior colleges (see
table 2). I started by comparing differences in enrollment. I found that FTE (full-time equivalent)
enrollment increased from 2374.6 to 3006, but the increase was not found to be significant. Of
the three types of institutions, community colleges routinely maintain the largest FTE enrollment,
but only technical colleges experienced a statistically significant increase. I believe this change
is due more to the ongoing mergers of individual sites into single data-reporting technical
colleges than a genuine increase in student enrollment. In fact, since 2012 student headcount
across all two-year institutions has decreased 13.3% (Louisiana Board of Regents).
Little substantial change in the proportion of full- and part-time enrollment was found.
The average percentage of full-time enrollment declined from 46.4% to 45% while the
percentage of part time enrollment increased from 53.6% to 55.1%, but neither difference was
statistically significant. Likewise, none of the three types of institutions saw any real variation in
full- or part-time enrollment. One area that did experience unexpected change was the
percentage of white student enrollment. White student enrollment decreased from 55% to
47.6% (t=2.65, p≤.01) across all two-year colleges while technical colleges and community
colleges, specifically, experienced a decline of 7.5 percentage points (t=2.12, p≤.05) and 8.9
percentage points (t=3.21, p≤.01), respectfully. Junior colleges also saw a decline in white
enrollment, but the difference was not statistically significant.
Trends in state appropriations and tuition and fees revenue were as expected. On
average, the percentage of core revenue from state funding decreased from 40.2% to 30.8%
(t=4.83, p≤.001) as income from tuition and fees increased from 12.8% to 19.5% (t=-4.23,
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p≤.001). Similar results were found when I examined differences in revenue source per FTE.
After adjusting for inflation, I discovered that revenue from tuition and fees grew by $556 per
FTE while revenue from appropriations fell by over $1473 per FTE. Even though the typical twoyear college had increased their tuition and fees 119% since 2008, it still was not enough to
offset the decline in state support. Extraordinarily, there were schools such as Northshore
Technical Community College and Capital Area Technical College that actually experienced a
250% increase in tuition during this time span (see Appendix C: Supplemental Table 1).
Interestingly, while examining revenue sources at the institutional level, I found a distinct
disparity in the extent to which the different types of schools were dependent on the state for
funding. In the years after the implementation of the GRAD Act, community colleges and junior
colleges saw their portion of core revenues from state appropriations dwindle to 24.9% and
24.5%, respectively, while technical colleges derived 40.5% of their revenue from state funds.
Initially I surmised that this may be a result of the greater amount of revenue that community
and/or junior colleges could garner from separate sources such as grants, gifts, investments,
etc. that may not be open to technical colleges. However, I found that in every year except
2011, technical colleges received substantially more state funding per FTE than did either
community colleges or junior colleges. Unfortunately, as the formula for state appropriations,
including the 15% supposedly tied to performance, is tangled up into layers of state and local
politics, I could not determine the reasons as to why funds were distributed in this manner.
Evidence suggests that the implementation of the GRAD Act did not influence two-year
colleges to increase the proportion of their budget spent on instruction. There were no
significant differences for any of the three types of institutions, although on average, technical
colleges utilized at least 10 percentage points more of their budgets toward instruction than
either community colleges or junior colleges. However, a review of FTE expenses on instruction
revealed a different picture. Expenditures per FTE actually fell from $4474 to $4081 (t=1.69,
p≤.05). This same trend was seen at all levels, but the greatest decrease occurred at the
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technical colleges. They cut spending on instruction by over $490 per FTE. Even with this
reduction, technical colleges still consistently spent more than community colleges and only fell
slightly below junior colleges in three out of the eight years.
Opposite results were found when I explored expenses on student support services. The
overall percentage of expenses for support increased from 14.5% to 17.8% (t=-2.60, p≤.01).
Although all three types of institutions increased their budget percentages for supportive
services, only technical colleges saw a statistically significant increase. Still, I found that actual
changes in expenses per FTE were minimal. No substantial differences were found at any
institutional level, though junior colleges unfailingly outspent either of the other two categories.
These results are consistent with previous findings that PBF caused limited change in
expenditure habits of effected colleges (Rabovsky 2012; Kelchen and Stedrak 2016).
Retention Rate
Before the GRAD Act average full-time retention was 52.4%, but after implementation
the rate fell to 51.7%. No significant difference was found between the two rates. Likewise, fulltime retention remained relatively flat at each of the three types of institutions. However, some
improvements were found in part-time retention. Overall, mean part-time retention increased
from 38.5% to 43.5% (t =-2.08, p≤.05). While technical colleges experienced a 13.3 percentage
point (t =-3.21, p≤.01) increase, community colleges and junior colleges saw little to no change.
Although this increase suggests a correlation between the GRAD Act and part-time retention, I
believe this change is more reflective of the types of awards usually conferred by technical
colleges and the way in which retention is measured. Retention rate data drawn from IPEDS
include both students that re-enrolled from the prior year and those that completed their
program. As technical colleges tend to issue more one-year or less certificates than other types
of institutions, their retention rates may be inflated simply because of their larger cohort. I
imagine if IPEDS only included students that re-enrolled at the same institution in their definition
of retention, the technical college rates would not have increased so substantially.
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Table 2: Mean Value (SD) of Institutional Characteristics Before (2008-2011) & After (2012-2015) GRAD Act
Technical Colleges
2008-2011
2012-2015

Community Colleges
2008-2011
2012-2015

Junior Colleges
2008-2011
2012-2015

Full-time Retention
Rate

56.6 (9.2)

54.9 (10.0)

49.9 (5.0)

49.8 (4.5)

47.9 (3.3)

49.3 (4.0)

Part-time Retention
Rate

36.4 (10.6)

49.7* (17.1)

37.6 (14.3)

37.9 (6.3)

48.3 (15.8)

46.0 (6.5)

Graduation Rate

44.2 (9.8)

49.1 (14.6)

8.6 (5.4)

13.1* (6.9)

10.0 (3.8)

12.0 (3.0)

Total awards per
100 FTE

145.9 (219.6)

132.4 (81.8)

26.6 (24.0)

44.4* (33.6)

14.8 (1.7)

17.6* (1.3)

FTE enrollment

1068.1 (638.4)

1635.4* (359.4)

3684.3 (3222.4)

4347.3 (3520.6)

2037.3 (250.5)

2085.3 (274.8)

% Full-time
enrollment

42.8 (17.6)

37.3 (11.8)

47.0 (7.6)

47.6 (10.3)

55.1 (5.1)

57.4 (10.5)

% Part-time
enrollment

57.2 (17.6)

62.7 (11.8)

53.0 (7.6)

52.4 (10.3)

44.9 (5.1)

42.6 (10.5)

% White enrollment

55.8 (12.8)

48.3† (11.8)

58.3 (10.2)

49.4† (10.4)

41.4 (27.9)

39.1 (30.9)

% Revenues from
state funds

46.9 (8.9)

40.5† (8.8)

36.0 (8.3)

24.9† (6.9)

33.0 (10.9)

24.5† (5.1)

% Revenues from
tuition & fees

6.9 (3.3)

12.6* (7.4)

18.1 (7.7)

25.5* (6.3)

13.3 (6.5)

17.8 (11.0)

% Expenses for
instruction

48.1 (3.9)

50.4 (6.0)

38.8 (8.8)

40.9 (7.1)

34.0 (14.7)

34.5 (17.7)

% Expenses for
student support

10.1 (1.2)

14.9* (6.5)

16.7 (5.0)

18.5 (6.1)

20.8 (9.4)

23.5 (11.9)

Note: Graduation rates were not available for 2008.
†
*Increase found at p≤.05. Decrease found at p≤.05.
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Random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression was applied to retention
rates. Retention rates are based on the percentage of the fall full-time or part-time cohort of firsttime degree/certificate-seeking students from the prior year that re-enrolled or successfully
completed their program by the following fall. Two models each were used for both full-time and
part-time retention, one that separated institutions into only two categories: community college
and technical college and a second model that further differentiated the institutions into three
categories: community college, technical college, and junior college.
Model 1: y=B0 +B1lnfenroll (lnpenroll) +B2fwhite% (pwhite%) +B3rstate%
+B4rtuition% +B5einstruc% +B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income
+B8reg_white% +B9zreg_score +B10tech +B11grad_act +ui
Model 2: y=B0 +B1lnfenroll (lnpenroll) +B2fwhite% (pwhite%) +B3rstate%
+B4rtuition% +B5einstruc% +B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income
+B8reg_white% +B9zreg_score +B10junior +B11grad_act +ui
Model 1, depicting the impact of the GRAD Act on full-time retention rates, was found to be
statistically significant (Wald chi2(11)=35.41, p≤.001). The regression output (see table 3)
revealed only one significant predictor at p≤.05: percentage of expenses on instruction. These
results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the overall percentage of funds
expended on instruction, holding all other variables constant, raises full-time retention rates by
.248 points. Model 2, which adds a control for junior colleges, was also significant (Wald
chi2(12)=31.33, p≤.01). The same significant predictor, percentage of expenses on instruction,
was found. This output suggests that accounting for junior colleges increases the predicted
average full-time retention rate by an additional .009 percentage point over Model 1. Both
models were also applied to part-time retention rates but only Model 2 was found to be
significant (Wald chi2(12)=21.01, p≤.05). The regression estimates indicate that, on average,
junior colleges have part-time retention rates that are 11.061 points greater than community
colleges, the reference group used in the model. This finding is supported by the mean part-time
retention rates outlined for each type of institution in table 2.
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Table 3: GLS Regression Estimates for Retention & Graduation Rates
Full-time Retention
Model 1 Model 2
Coef.
Coef.
(S.E.)
(S.E.)
Full-time
enrollment (log)

1.219
(1.255)

Part-time Retention
Model 1
Model 2
Coef.
Coef.
(S.E.)
(S.E.)

1.540
(1.352)

Part-time
enrollment (log)

0.199
(2.437)

1.676
(2.452)

FTE enrollment
(log)
% Full-time white
enrollment

-0.068
(0.063)

Graduation Rate
Model 1
Model 2
Coef.
Coef.
(S.E.)
(S.E.)

3.082
(2.542)

2.885
(2.552)

0.147
(0.128)

0.146
(0.128)

-0.061
(0.068)

% Part-time white
enrollment

-0.090
(0.119)

-0.040
(0.118)

% White
enrollment
% Revenue from
state funds

-0.039
(0.085)

-0.020
(0.087)

-0.151
(0.153)

-0.120
(0.150)

0.006
(0.132)

0.004
(0.132)

% Revenue from
tuition & fees

0.071
(0.130)

0.098
(0.132)

0.096
(0.224)

0.129
(0.219)

-0.351
(0.185)

-0.358**
(0.186)

% Expenses for
instruction

0.248*
(0.107)

0.257*
(0.111)

0.322
(0.212)

0.290
(0.208)

0.283
(0.178)

0.286
(0.178)

% Expenses for
student support

-0.075
(0.108)

-0.099
(0.109)

0.383
(0.213)

0.299
(0.211)

0.062
(0.147)

0.061
(0.148)

Regional median
income (log)

2.358
(4.900)

4.561
(5.268)

-6.524
(9.836)

-1.411
(9.823)

5.352
(8.074)

5.476
(8.179)

% Regional white
population

0.062
(0.107)

0.060
(0.109)

-0.141
(0.199)

-0.099
(0.195)

-0.113
(0.168)

-0.115
(0.168)

Regional (K-12)
score

0.980
(1.394)

0.874
(1.398)

1.186
(2.736)

1.173
(2.672)

0.860
(2.245)

0.898
(2.264)

Grad Act

-2.378
(1.616)

-2.387
(1.629)

0.313
(3.207)

0.612
(3.135)

5.753**
(2.256)

5.827**
(2.270)

Technical College

4.586
(2.633)

4.958
(2.869)

5.205
(4.753)

8.014
(4.776)

28.227**
(4.687)

28.650**
(4.770)

Junior College

2.879
(3.020)

11.061**
(4.433)

1.412
(5.764)

Intercept

7.564
(52.169)

-20.329
(56.924)

105.035
(99.953)

32.145
(101.896)

-77.999
(84.143)

-77.953
(86.532)

Wald chi2

35.41**

31.33**

14.10

21.01*

104.23**

111.91**

Note: Retention Rate models (N=120) include data from 2008-2015. Graduation Rate models (N=105)
include data from 2009-2015. *p≤.05. **p≤.01
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Graduation Rate
As mentioned previously, graduation rates derived from IPEDS data are based on firsttime, full-time degree/certificate-seeking students. In this study, I focus on those students that
completed their program within 150% of normal time (the amount of time necessary for a
student to complete all requirements for a degree or certificate). On average, rates increased
from 23% to 26.8%, but these changes were not found to be statistically significant. Although all
types of institutions were able to increase their graduation rates in the years since the GRAD
Act was passed, only community colleges demonstrated a significant improvement. They raised
their mean rate from 8.6% to 13.1% (t=-2.62, p≤.01). Across all years, technical colleges
maintained the highest graduation rate by averaging 46.9% compared to 11.2% by community
colleges and 11.1% by junior colleges. As with retention rates, I attribute these sizeable
differences to the shorter length of programs that technical colleges tend to offer. Unfortunately,
since most studies examining the impact of performance-based funding policies on graduation
rates have concentrated on bachelor degree granting institutions, there is currently no research
on which to compare these findings.
As with retention, I applied a random-effects GLS model to graduation rates. The models
for graduation rates utilized the same estimates as with retention rates, but instead of
differentiating between full-time and part-time enrollment, FTE enrollment was used as the
control variable.
Model 1: y=B0 +B1lnfte_enroll +B2white% +B3rstate% +B4rtuition% +B5einstruc%
+B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income +B8reg_white% +B9zreg_score +B10tech
+B11grad_act +ui
Model 2: y=B0 +B1lnfte_enroll +B2white% +B3rstate% +B4rtuition% +B5einstruc%
+B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income +B8reg_white% +B9zreg_score
+B10junior +B11grad_act +ui
Model 1 was found to be statistically significant (Wald chi2(11)=104.23, p≤.001). Two significant
predictors were found at p≤.05: GRAD Act and Technical College. These results suggest that
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graduation rates, on average, were 5.753 points greater after the implementation of the GRAD
Act and technical colleges tend to have graduation rates 28.227 points higher than community
colleges. Model 2 yielded almost identical results. The equation was found to be significant
(Wald chi2(12)=111.91, p≤.001) and included the same predictors.
Awards Productivity
As seen in recent studies, I expect an upsurge in short-term certificates and limited
increases in long-term certificates and associate degrees (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015;
Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Tandberg, Hillman, and
Barakat 2015; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015). I did not find the anticipated increase
in short-term certificates, but data revealed a slight uptick in the number of long-term certificates
and associate degrees conferred. Although the average quantity of short-term certificates
increased from 631.5 to 840.6, it was not a significant difference. Community colleges were the
only type of institution to increase their short-term certificates. They experienced an average
increase of 238.9 certificates (t=-2.12; p≤.05). These results did not hold when I examined shortterm certificates per 100 FTE. No significant differences were found across two-year colleges or
in any institution type. Actually, short-term certificates decreased by almost 10 certificates per
100 FTE after implementation of the GRAD Act. Seemingly, junior colleges have stayed out of
the business of issuing short-term certificates altogether.
Interestingly, as shown in the first graph of figure 2, the number of short-term certificates
fell greatly between 2009 and 2010. I surmise that the drop resulted from a change in reporting
technique that eliminated the inclusion of non-credit certificates. When I explored this
phenomenon further, I found the data on short-term certificates troubling. There are huge
disparities not only between institutions, even those in the same category, but also within
institutions (see Appendix B). Junior colleges remained consistent in issuing the rare certificate,
but some community colleges reported none over the eight years of this study. These numbers
do not coincide with those reported to the Louisiana Board of Regents (2016 Louisiana Higher
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Education Fact Book). Again, perhaps misunderstandings on degree definitions are occurring.
However, this does not explain the wide fluctuations within a college’s own reporting. I can only
presume that some colleges received funds for a specialized short-term program that was not
continued in the following academic year.

Figure 2: Awards Productivity per 100 Full-time Equivalent
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There were greater consistencies in data on long-term certificates, those taking at least
one to two-years to complete. On average, the number of certificates increased significantly
from 240.8 to 498.1(t=-4.45, p≤.001). Community colleges and technical colleges saw increases
of 202.4% (t=-3.98, p≤.001) and 69.1% (t=-3.58, p≤.001), respectively. The gains for long-term
certificates per FTE were likewise significant, although the percentage increases were not of the
same magnitude. As with short-term certificates, junior colleges saw little to no movement in
their numbers. An examination of associate degrees conferred revealed an overall increase
from 201.7 to 292.1 (t=-1.7228, p≤.01). However, in opposition to findings on certificates, the
only type of institution to realize gains was junior colleges. They experienced a 15.9% (t=-3.53,
p≤.01) increase. Although similar results were found overall and for junior colleges when I
standardized associate degrees per 100 FTE, significant increases for community colleges also
presented themselves. They grew the number of associate degrees per 100 FTE from 8 to 10.5
(t=-3.76, p≤.001). Technical colleges experienced a slight increase in associate degrees, but the
change was not significant. These results tend to fall in line with the given missions of the
individual type of institution. Remarkably, while a significant increase of 50% (t=-2.70, p≤.001) in
total awards occurred across all two-year colleges, these gains completely disappeared when
standardized against 100 FTE. The total number of awards per 100 FTE actually remained flat.
It seems that the implementation of the GRAD Act had no real impact on the number of awards
conferred.
GLS logistic regression models were applied to the four dependent measures related to
awards productivity. All models utilized the same predictors as in the graduation rate equations.
Model 1: Pr(y=1)=F(B0 +B1lnfte_enroll +B2white% +B3rstate% +B4rtuition%
+B5einstruc% +B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income +B8reg_white%
+B9zreg_score +B10tech +B11grad_act) +ui
Model 2: Pr(y=1)=F(B0 +B1lnfte_enroll +B2white% +B3rstate% +B4rtuition%
+B5einstruc% +B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income +B8reg_white%
+B9zreg_score +B10junior +B11grad_act) +ui
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Significant increases in performance occurred in 2010 and 2014 for short-term certifications;
2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 for associate degrees; and 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2014 for longterm certificates and total awards. Both Model 1 (Wald chi2(11)=23.32, p≤.05) and Model 2
(Wald chi2(12)=23.76, p≤.05) applied to associate degree productivity were found to be
statistically significant. In each equation, two significant predictors were found at p≤.05:
percentage of core revenue from state funds and percentage of expenses on student support.
The results for Model 1 indicate that for each percentage point increase in revenue derived from
state funds, the odds of a significant increase in performance from the prior year decreases by a
factor of 0.883, holding all other variables constant. A similar outcome was found for percentage
of expenses on student support. Each percentage point increase in expenses on student
support decreases the odds of a significant increase in performance by a factor of 0.900. As the
odds predicted by Model 2 were identical to Model 1, I can conclude that the added control for
junior colleges did not impact associate degree productivity.
Obviously, these results are nonsensical. As noted in the descriptive statistics, state
funds fell consistently as a percentage of revenue while the percentage of expenses on student
support remained relatively flat except for in 2015 when there was a dramatic 11 percentage
point increase. The large increase in 2015 disrupts the equation and allows for improved
performance to be aligned with smaller percentages of expenses on student support. If 2015 is
omitted from the equation, this variable is no longer a significant predictor. These findings are
not an indication that less state funding or decreases in expenses on student support increases
performance, but are simply a reflection that these events happened to occur during the time
span of this study. Clearly, a longer time frame in which to study the lagged effects of the GRAD
Act is needed in order to judge whether increases in performance in associate degree
productivity remains related to these predictors.
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Table 4: GLS Logistic Regression Estimates for Award Productivity
Associate Degrees

Long-term Certificates &
Total Awards

Model 1
OR
(S.E.)

Model 2
OR
(S.E.)

Model 1
OR
(S.E.)

Model 2
OR
(S.E.)

FTE enrollment (log)

1.564
(0.697)

1.730
(0.796)

0.992
(0.454)

1.014
(0.478)

% White enrollment

1.014
(0.022)

1.018
(0.023)

0.982
(0.022)

0.983
(0.022)

% Revenue from state
funds

0.883**
(0.028)

0.883**
(0.028)

0.946
(0.028)

0.946
(0.028)

% Revenue from tuition &
fees

0.968
(0.042)

0.968
(0.042)

1.044
(0.048)

1.044
(0.048)

% Expenses for
instruction

1.011
(0.037)

1.010
(0.037)

0.997
(0.037)

0.997
(0.037)

% Expenses for student
support

0.900**
(0.038)

0.896**
(0.038)

0.945
(0.040)

0.944
(0.040)

Regional median income
(log)

2.560
4.241

3.857
(6.632)

0.621
(1.036)

0.688
(1.202)

% Regional white
population

0.948
(0.035)

0.948
(0.036)

0.998
(0.037)

0.999
(0.037)

Regional (K-12) score

1.483
(0.712)

1.521
(0.736)

1.136
(0.573)

1.135
(0.570)

Grad Act

0.456
(0.256)

0.460
(0.260)

0.044**
(0.029)

0.044**
(0.029)

Technical College

2.711
(2.289)

3.293
(2.884)

2.142
(1.891)

2.232
(2.028)

Junior College

2.068
(1.623)

1.178
(0.983)

Intercept

0.011
(0.184)

0.000
(0.001)

17587.52
(312159.6)

4491.622
(85528.23)

Wald chi2

23.32*

23.76*

29.34*

29.32**

Note: Models (N=120) include data from 2008-2015. *p≤.05. **p≤.01

As the years in which performance increased were the same for long-term certificates
and total awards, the logistic regression outputs were identical. Both Model 1 (Wald
chi2(11)=29.34, p≤.05) and Model 2 (Wald chi2(12)=29.32, p≤.05) were found to be statistically
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significant. In each equation, only one significant predictor was found at p≤.05: Grad Act. The
results indicate that, holding all other variables constant, the odds of an increase in performance
in long-term certificates and total awards productivity decreased by a factor of 0.044 after the
GRAD Act was introduced. A closer look at the data reveals that of the four years in which an
increase in performance was found, three of those were before the GRAD Act. These results do
not suggest that the GRAD Act actually caused performance to drop, but that performance did
not increase as a result of its implementation. Again, controlling for junior colleges did not
impact the overall findings. Their performance was not significantly different from community
colleges. Neither model for short-term certificates was found to be statistically significant. The
lack of years in which increases in performance occurred reduced the likelihood that the
equations would produce meaningful estimates.
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Conclusion
The Louisiana Granting Resources and Autonomies for Diplomas Act (GRAD Act),
signed into law in June 2010, instituted performance benchmarks for state colleges that, if met,
allowed them to increase their own tuition by up to 10% per year. Additionally, the performancebased funding policy tied 15% of a college’s overall state funding to meeting the GRAD Act
goals. In this study, I attempt to discover if this law and its financial incentives were able to
inspire two-year schools to improve performance. My findings were inconclusive. Across all twoyear schools, graduation rates remained around 24%. The only type of institution to significantly
increase its graduation numbers was community colleges. However, their rates only increased
from a paltry 8.6% to 13.1%. However, regression estimates indicated that the GRAD Act was a
significant predictor and that graduation rates tended to be 5.753 points higher after its
implementation. This provides some confirmation that the GRAD Act had a positive impact on
graduation rates of two-year institutions in Louisiana. Similar studies on the impact of
performance-based funding policies found no evidence of increased graduation rates at
bachelor degree granting institutions (Fryar 2011; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and
Hunter 2011; Shin 2010; Shin and Milton 2004). Unfortunately, no other studies on rates at twoyear schools are available for comparison.
Although understandable as a standardizing measure, I find graduation rates a poor
comparison tool. Even when narrowing down the pool to only two-year institutions, there were
great disparities between types of institution. This highlights the confusing nature of reporting
the same measure across schools with different missions. Also, since the measure only
includes first-time/full-time students, I believe that it provides little value in an environment in
which students may be more likely to attend school part-time, transfer between institutions,
and/or have varying educational goals. It seems best to marry graduation rates with other
measures such as time-to-degree completion, retention, articulation agreements, and/or degree
productivity when evaluating school performance.
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The GRAD Act did not directly increase full-time retention rates, which remained flat
across all years included in the study. However, regression estimates did reveal a link between
percentage of expenses on instruction and full-time retention. These results indicate that a one
percentage point increase in the overall percentage of funds expended on instruction improved
full-time retention by about a quarter of a percentage point. Some improvements were also
found in part-time retention. The average rate across two-year institutions grew five percentage
points after the GRAD Act was introduced. This increase is due largely to the double-digit
change in part-time retention rate at technical colleges. As technical colleges tend to offer more
one-year or less certificate programs, which usually do not require full-time attendance, their
part-time retention rates are most likely inflated by their greater quantity of enrollees and
completers. Still, the corresponding regression output did not indicate that any improvements in
part-time retention rates were related to the GRAD Act. These results tend to mirror those found
in other national and state-level (Tennessee and Washington) studies (Hillman, Tandberg, and
Fryar 2015; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011).
The data did not indicate the anticipated increase in short-term certificates (Hillman,
Tandberg, and Fryar 2015; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Rutherford and Rabovsky
2014; Tandberg, Hillman, and Barakat 2015; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015), but did
reveal an uptick in the number of long-term certificates and associate degrees conferred. On
average, the number of associate degrees issued grew by 44.8%, while the number of longterm certificates increased 106.9%. These increases are still visible when the numbers of
awards were standardized against 100 FTE. However, the corresponding regression estimates
for both associate degrees and long-term certificates/total awards give little indication that the
introduction of the GRAD Act was the catalyst for these changes. The models for associate
degrees absurdly predicted that a decrease in state funds and expenses on student support
increased productivity, while, the models for long-term certificates/total awards indicated that the
implementation of the GRAD Act actually caused declines in productivity. I can discern that the
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implementation of the GRAD Act had little direct positive impact on awards productivity,
regardless of type. Obviously, more time, data, and stability in the community college and
technical systems are required before any real conclusions can be drawn about the long-term
impacts of the GRAD Act on institutional effectiveness.
Even though findings imply that the financial incentives provided through performancebased funding policies do not greatly contribute to improvements in certain institutional
performance measures, there are examples of positive impacts generated by these types of
funding models. Some suggest that the performance reporting required by these policies
actually produce the greatest benefit. As one article noted in 2002, the “threat of bad publicity
and embarrassment associated with poor reviews” may be more impactful than funding
schemes in altering institutional behavior (Schmidt 2002). In 2015, Stan Jones from the
Complete College America Organization echoed this sentiment. He recommends that states
maintain PBF policies because they encourage transparency by forcing colleges to continue
performance reporting (Mangan 2015). If done correctly, performance reporting offers the public
and lawmakers a barometer against which to compare schools of interest. However, it also
provides an avenue for many to misunderstand and incorrectly equate schools of dissimilar
mission. Unfortunately, Louisiana’s current format of performance reporting does not provide
enough differentiation between institution types for the layperson to make intelligent decisions.
This muddling could allow a community college to be disparaged because its graduation rate
was unfairly compared to the state’s flagship four-year university. Regrettably, empirical
research that directly links performance reporting and the possibility of resulting embarrassment
as a method of improving institutional performance is insufficient from which to draw
conclusions.
I contend that the greatest achievement of the GRAD Act has been the improvement in
the quality of higher education data. As revealed through performance audits conducted by the
Louisiana Legislative Auditor’s Office, there has been a significant increase in the reliability of
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the data provided to the state by post-secondary institutions. In fact, only one school was found
to have had any audit findings during the 2016 audit (see table 5). I also found a greater
consistency across data reported to IPEDS once the state instituted the auditing process in
response to the GRAD Act. Perhaps the funding model could still have long-term beneficial
effects if the colleges utilize the wealth of information provided through performance reporting
as an internal management tool to guide decision-making (Miller, Robbins, and Keum 2007).

Table 5: Performance Audit Findings of Not Sufficiently Reliable Data
Institution
Baton Rouge Community College

2012

2013

2014

X

X

X

Bossier Parish Community College

2015

X

2016

X

Capital Area Technical College*

X

X

Central Louisiana Technical Community College

X

X

X

X

X

X

Northshore Technical Community College

X

X

Northwest Louisiana Technical College

X

X

Delgado Community College
Fletcher Technical Community College
Louisiana State University-Eunice

Nunez Community College

X

River Parishes Community College
South Central Louisiana Technical College

X

X

South Louisiana Community College

X

X

X

X

Southern University at Shreveport

X

X

X

X

SOWELA Technical Community College

X

Source: Louisiana Legislative Auditor
*In 2014 Capital Area Technical College merged with Baton Rouge Community College so was not
audited separately in 2014 and 2015

Regardless of the benefits ushered in by performance-based funding legislation, there
remain a plethora of concerns about the unintended consequences that may result from
mandated benchmarks. Various researchers and some college officials predict that pressure to
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meet these performance standards may force some schools to increase selectivity and/or lower
academic standards. Evidence that performance-based funding requirements have forced fouryear institutions to increase selectivity through higher admissions requirements has been
documented in Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee (Dougherty et al. 2016; Umbricht, Fernandez, and
Ortagus 2015). In Louisiana, increasing minimum standards at four-year schools was actually a
tenet of the GRAD Act. The legislation called for four-year institutions to raise their minimum
American College Test (ACT) score required for admission, eliminate remedial/developmental
course offerings, and discontinue associate degree programs (Louisiana Granting Resources
and Autonomy for Diplomas Act 2010). Seemingly, two-year schools have benefited as a result.
As previously mentioned, enrollment numbers suggest that tuition hikes and these more
restrictive admissions standards are forcing more Louisiana students to choose two-year
colleges (Russell 2016). However, while four-year schools may be more likely to meet their
benchmarks because of this refined student body, two-year schools have the added burden of
fulfilling performance requirements with an even larger population of students who tend to have
long-standing academic, social, and financial challenges (Dougherty et al. 2016). Again, this is
why it is so important to differentiate between missions in establishing performance measures.
Some fear that increased selectivity might reduce racial and ethnic diversity on college
campuses. After decades of concentrating on expanding access for underrepresented and/or
disadvantaged students, higher education reformers seem to have shifted focus to maximizing
performance (Burke1998). Unfortunately, maximizing performance through raised admission
standards may prevent some marginalized students from attending college or even being
recruited. Evidence suggests that schools have changed their recruiting habits to focus on those
students more likely to meet the new standards and complete their programs instead of
broadening their student base (Dougherty, et al. 2016). Diversity can further be stilted when
schools switch from issuing need-based financial aid to merit-based. The additional financial
resources many minority students require may not be available because schools could transfer
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those funds to students they deem more likely to be retained or graduated (Dougherty, et al.
2016; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015). This can happen at both four-year schools and
open-admission colleges. Actually, this study provides some indication that diversity may be
declining at Louisiana four-year schools. There has been a 7.3% increase in non-white FTE
enrollment at two-year schools since the GRAD Act was signed into law. Although it is
impossible to say definitively this change is a result of decreased access for minority students at
the state’s four-year schools, it is an interesting statistic that should be explored further.
Others worry that increased mandated performance goals may cause schools to lower
academic standards (Alexander 2000; Dougherty, et al. 2016; Umbricht, Fernandez, and
Ortagus 2015). This can occur when faculty is instructed to reduce failure rates by inflating
grades or lessening course rigor. Schools can also scale back the number of required courses
needed for graduation. This is a more subtle way in which to fast track completion numbers
compared to inflated grades, but still effective for helping to meet performance benchmarks. Yet
another concern is the growth in the issuance of worthless degrees. Across the country, there
has been marked increases in short-term certificate programs, both credit and non-credit.
Although these awards help schools more quickly meet productivity measures and increase
revenue, research has shown that they have very limited economic value when compared to
associate degrees or even long-term certificates (Dadgar and Trimble 2015; Hillman, Tandberg,
and Fryar 2015; Xu and Trimble 2016). Some, mostly those in higher education, assert that
short-term successes, like receiving one of these certificates, are important for struggling
students (Mangan 2014). They declare that these short-term gains encourage students to later
pursue more long-term credentials and/or degrees. Obviously, additional empirical research
needs to be conducted on this assertion before any definitive conclusions can be drawn on the
true worth of these types of awards.
As much of the literature finds that performance-based funding is not a panacea for all
state budgetary and performance ills, why do states still look to PBF as a solution? It seems that
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politics is one of the main, if not the most important, influence in turning to a performance-based
funding model for higher education (Burke and Minassians 2003; McLendon, Hearn and Mokher
2009; Tandberg 2010). Lawmakers believe that these types of funding programs show their
constituents that they are being good stewards of public funding by helping “to reduce or
eliminate wasteful activities…and to get more ‘bang for the buck’ by spending less money on
programs that do not work and more on those that do” (Rabovsky 2012, 676). Given its
popularity, it seems that performance-based funding will remain part of the higher education
landscape (Schmidt 2002).
A number of recommendations exist on how states can design and implement
performance-based policies that would help to increase their impact on higher education and
reduce any unintended negative consequences (Friedal et al. 2013; Hermes 2012; Miao. 2012).
Policy makers must obtain buy-in from key stakeholders such as legislators, college
administrators, faculty, and local business and industry leader. Without input from involved
parties, implementation of the program will be difficult. States should include both outcome and
progress measures that reflect the diverse nature of missions, recognize interim successes, and
reflect regional needs. Using these varied types of measures will provide a more complete
picture of effectiveness and performance. However, states should be wary of overly complex
metrics that can cause confusion and reduce the effectiveness and implementation of
performance-based policies. Burke, Modarresi and Serban (1999) tell us that the “most
successful programs include from eight to 15 indicators” because “having too few indicators
ignores many of the multiple objectives of colleges and universities. Having too many indicators
trivializes major priorities by according them very little funding” (22).
New funding models should be phased in so institutions have time to set reasonable
benchmarks, adjust procedures, and build organizational capacity. Unfortunately, hurried
implementation of performance funding can leave colleges with “little detail on what specific
institutional changes are expected and how those changes are to be achieved” (ASHE 2013,
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12). This is why it is so crucial that states commit significant stable funding that both incentivizes
institutions to increase performance and allows for long-term planning. Institutions need to see
that they will be gaining additional resources in order to find performance-based funding worthy
of their time and effort. Finally, programs must be given a long enough period in which to be
effective. In instances where gains have been found, they did not generally present themselves
until six to eight years after implementation (Layzell 1998). Longevity allows for more productive
and thorough evaluations of policy tenets and related metrics (Sanford; Hillman, Shin and Milton
2004; Tandberg, and Fryar 2015).
The area of performance-based funding is rife with research possibilities. Additional
multivariate research that attempts to disentangle the effects of PBF from other events like
political happenings, school mergers, and increased admission requirements needs to be
conducted. Although generalizability is gained through national and/or regional studies of this
kind, I believe that state-level studies allow researchers to better detail the specifics surrounding
a policy’s implementation and how those particulars affect its impact. I would also like to see
more long-term studies that follow students who have obtained the short and/or long-term
certificates seemingly encouraged by performance-based funding policies to see if they return to
further their education and to what extent these additional credentials impact earnings. Lastly,
there needs to be more scholarship on how substantial shifts in school expenditures away from
administrative support and toward instruction and student services affect school performance.
Although the GRAD Act has produced limited gains in institutional effectiveness, I
believe that a revamped version could yield the improvements that we all seek in higher
education. Most state colleges were excited for the opportunity to utilize the performance-based
funding model created in the GRAD Act to increase their coffers with the side benefit of
improving graduation rates. Unfortunately, like most performance-based funding legislation, it
become a way for colleges to simply maintain budget levels during a time of declining state
support rather than an impetus for increasing institutional accomplishments (Alexander 2000;
40

Serban and Burke 1998). This has to change in order for the policy to be effective. Obviously,
the state must provide adequate financial support to the colleges. However, colleges must also
make the necessary changes in expenditures and organization needed to facilitate
improvement. This will require hard and uncomfortable decisions to be made by administrators,
but those decisions should not be made without faculty and staff input. Also, the Louisiana
Board of Regents must provide leadership to the colleges on how to build the organizational
capacity required to provide the best education for their students. The updated policy should
include separate measures for two-year and four-year schools that are specific to their mission.
These measures should incentivize schools and not penalize them for providing access to
underrepresented groups. Also, benchmarks need to be more robust. Over the course of the six
years that the GRAD Act has been in effect, there have only been five instances in which one of
the 15 two-year schools did not meet the required minimum level of 80% in student success to
gain authority to raise tuition (see Appendix C: Supplemental Table 2). Since findings from this
study suggest that the increases in retention, graduation rates, and awards productivity were
either limited or nonexistent, I can assume that the required standards were rather minor.
Ultimately, in any discussion about money and performance, we need to remember the students
and the faculty/staff of the institutions. Institutions do not make improvements; the people who
work there do. Liefner (2003) reminds us that colleges “with a large number of highly motivated
and qualified faculty will be successful regardless of the form of resource allocation;” a
sentiment which should remain at the forefront of any decision regarding higher education (486).
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Appendix A: Codebook
Variable:
Variable Name:
Value Labels:

Institution Abbreviation
inst
brcc: Baton Rouge Community College; bpcc: Bossier Parish Community
College; catc: Capital Area Technical College; cltcc: Central Louisiana
Technical Community College; dcc: Delgado Community College; lsue:
Louisiana State University-Eunice; ntcc: Northshore Technical
Community College; nwltc: Northwest Louisiana Technical College; ncc:
Nunez Community College; rpcc: River Parishes Community College;
scltc: South Central Louisiana Technical College; slcc: South Louisiana
Community College; suas: Southern University at Shreveport; sowela:
SOWELA Technical Community College

Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Louisiana Community & Technical College System website, Louisiana
State University System website, Southern University System website
Commonly used abbreviation of an institution's name. Represents the
panel dataset-defining variable.
Academic Year
aydate
IPEDS: HD2014, HD2013, HD2012, HD2011, HD2010, HD2009,
HD2008, HD2007
An academic year begins with the Fall semester (August-December) and
carries over into the Spring semester (January-May) and Summer
semester (June-July) of the following calendar year. Represents the time
defining variable. Dataset includes date from 2008 to 2015.
Total Awards Productivity
awards
1=Yes; a statistically significant positive difference was found
0=No; a statistically significant positive difference was not found
IPEDS: DRVC2015, DRVC2014, DRVC2013_RV, DRVC2012_RV,
DRVC2011_RV, DRVC2010_RV, DRVC2009_RV, DRVC2008_RV
Dummy variable indicating whether a paired sample t test found a
statistically significant difference in means between two consecutive
academic years' total number of awards conferred -- including
certificates, 1-year certificates, 2-year certificates, and associate
degrees.
Associate Degree Productivity
awards_ad
1=Yes; a statistically significant positive difference was found
0=No; a statistically significant positive difference was not found
IPEDS: DRVC2015, DRVC2014, DRVC2013_RV, DRVC2012_RV,
DRVC2011_RV, DRVC2010_RV, DRVC2009_RV, DRVC2008_RV
Dummy variable indicating whether a paired sample t test found a
statistically significant difference in means between two consecutive
academic years' number of associate degrees conferred. An associate
degree requires completion of an organized program of study of at least
2 but less than 4 years of full-time equivalent college work.
Long-term Certificate Productivity
awards_certlong

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Value Labels:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Value Labels:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
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Value Labels:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Value Labels:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

1=Yes; a statistically significant positive difference was found
0=No; a statistically significant positive difference was not found
IPEDS: DRVC2015, DRVC2014, DRVC2013_RV, DRVC2012_RV,
DRVC2011_RV, DRVC2010_RV, DRVC2009_RV, DRVC2008_RV
Dummy variable indicating whether a paired sample t test found a
statistically significant difference in means between two consecutive
academic years' number of long-term certificates conferred. A long-term
certificate requires completion of an organized program of study in at
least 2 but less than 4 full-time equivalent academic years or designed
for completion in at least 60 but less than 120 semester credit hours.
Short-term Certificate Productivity
awards_cert
1=Yes; a statistically significant positive difference was found
0=No; a statistically significant positive difference was not found
IPEDS: DRVC2015, DRVC2014, DRVC2013_RV, DRVC2012_RV,
DRVC2011_RV, DRVC2010_RV, DRVC2009_RV, DRVC2008_RV
Dummy variable indicating whether a paired sample t test found a
statistically significant difference in means between two consecutive
academic years' number of short-term certificates conferred. A shortterm certificate requires the completion of an organized program of study
in less than 1 academic year (2 semesters), or designed for completion
in less than 30 semester credit hours.
Part-time Retention Rate
pret%
IPEDS: EF2014D, EF2013D_RV, EF2012D_RV, EF2011D_RV,
EF2010D_RV, EF2009D_RV, EF2008D_RV, EF2007D
Part-time retention rate is the percentage of the fall part-time cohort of
first-time degree/certificate-seeking students from the prior year (minus
exclusions) that re-enrolled at the institution as either full- or part-time or
successfully completed their program by the current fall. Exclusions
include students who could not reenroll because of death, permanent
disability, armed service duty, foreign aid service duty, or church mission
service.

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Full-time Retention Rate
fret%
IPEDS: EF2014D, EF2013D_RV, EF2012D_RV, EF2011D_RV,
EF2010D_RV, EF2009D_RV, EF2008D_RV, EF2007D
Full-time retention rate is the percentage of the fall full-time cohort of
first-time degree/certificate-seeking students from the prior year (minus
exclusions) that re-enrolled at the institution as either full- or part-time or
successfully completed their program by the current fall. Exclusions
include students who could not reenroll because of death, permanent
disability, armed service duty, foreign aid service duty, or church mission
service.

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:

Graduation Rate
grad%
IPEDS: DRVG2015, DRVG2014, DRVG2013_RV, DRVG2012_RV,
DRVG2011_RV, DRVG2010_RV, DRVG2009_RV
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Definition:

Graduation rate is the percentage of the first-time, full-time
degree/certificate-seeking graduation cohort that completed a program
within 150% of normal time (the amount of time necessary for a student
to complete all requirements for a degree or certificate according to the
institution's catalog). This rate is calculated as the total number of
completers within 150% of normal time divided by the revised cohort
minus any allowable exclusions. Exclusions include students who could
not reenroll because of death, permanent disability, armed service duty,
foreign aid service duty, or church mission service.

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:

Part-time Enrollment Rate
penroll%
IPEDS: DRVEF2014, DRVEF2013_RV, DRVEF2012_RV,
DRVEF2011_RV, DRVEF2010_RV, DRVEF2009_RV, DRVEF2008_RV,
DRVEF2007
Total number of part-time students enrolled in the fall semester divided
by the total number of students enrolled in the same semester.
Full-time Enrollment Rate
fenroll%
IPEDS: DRVEF2014, DRVEF2013_RV, DRVEF2012_RV,
DRVEF2011_RV, DRVEF2010_RV, DRVEF2009_RV, DRVEF2008_RV,
DRVEF2007
Total number of full-time students enrolled in the fall semester divided by
the total number of students enrolled in the same semester.
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) Enrollment
lnfte_enroll
IPEDS: DRVEF2014, DRVEF2013_RV, DRVEF2012_RV,
DRVEF2011_RV, DRVEF2010_RV, DRVEF2009_RV, DRVEF2008_RV,
DRVEF2007
Log of FTE fall enrollment. The number of FTE students is calculated by
adding the full-time fall student headcounts to the part-time fall
headcount multiplied by 0.335737 (factor for public 2-year colleges).
Part-time White Enrollment Rate
pwhite%
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV,
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A
Total number of part-time white students enrolled during the fall
semester divided by the total number of part-time students enrolled
during that same semester.
Full-time White Enrollment Rate
fwhite%
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV,
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A
Total number of full-time white students enrolled during the fall semester
divided by the total number of full-time students enrolled during that
same semester.
Total White Enrollment Rate
white%
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV,
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A

Definition:
Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:
Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
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Definition:
Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:
Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:
Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:
Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:
Variable:
Variable Name:
Variable Labels:
Data Source &
Tables:

Total number of white students enrolled during the fall semester divided
by the total number of students enrolled during that same semester.
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) White Enrollment
fte_white
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV,
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A
The number of white FTE students is calculated by adding the white fulltime fall student headcounts to the white part-time fall headcount
multiplied by 0.335737 (factor for public 2-year colleges).
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) Non-White Enrollment
fte_nonwhite
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV,
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A
The number of non-white FTE students is calculated by adding the nonwhite full-time fall student headcounts to the non-white part-time fall
headcount multiplied by 0.335737 (factor for public 2-year colleges).
Tuition & Fee Revenue Rate
rtuition%
IPEDS: DRVF2015, DRVF2014, DRVF2013_RV, DRVF2012_RV,
DRVF2011_RV, DRVF2010_RV, DRVF2009_RV, DRVF2008_RV
Total percentage of core revenue derived from tuition and fees.
State Appropriations Revenue Rate
rstate%
IPEDS: DRVF2015, DRVF2014, DRVF2013_RV, DRVF2012_RV,
DRVF2011_RV, DRVF2010_RV, DRVF2009_RV, DRVF2008_RV
Total percentage of core revenue derived from state appropriations.
Instruction Expense Rate
einstruc%
IPEDS: DRVF2015, DRVF2014, DRVF2013_RV, DRVF2012_RV,
DRVF2011_RV, DRVF2010_RV, DRVF2009_RV, DRVF2008_RV
Total percentage of core expenses derived from instruction costs.
Support Expense Rate
esupport%
IPEDS: DRVF2015, DRVF2014, DRVF2013_RV, DRVF2012_RV,
DRVF2011_RV, DRVF2010_RV, DRVF2009_RV, DRVF2008_RV
Total percentage of core expenses derived from student services and
academic support costs.
Grad Act
grad_act
1=Yes; a GRAD Act agreement existed
0=No; a GRAD Act agreement did not exist
Louisiana Board of Regents
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Definition:

Dummy variable indicating whether an institution had an agreement with
the Board of Regents in which they received the authority to raise tuition
up to 10% if certain targeted performance measures were achieved.
Although the GRAD Act was signed into law in June 2010, institutions
were not required to meet established performance measures until the
2011-2012 academic year. As such, the 2012 academic year will act as
year one of the GRAD Act.

Variable:
Variable Name:
Variable Labels:

Accreditation
tech
1=Yes, the institution was a member of COE during that specific
academic year
0=No, the institution was not a member of COE during that specific
academic year
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges
(SACSCOC) Member and Candidate List (July 2016); Council on
Occupational Education (COE) Membership Directory (June 2016)
Dummy variable indicating whether an institution is a member of COE,
thus considered a Technical College, during that specific academic year.
Accreditation
junior
2=No, the institution was not a member of COE during that specific
academic year & was managed by a four-year system
1=Yes, the institution was a member of COE during that specific
academic year
0=No, the institution was not a member of COE during that specific
academic year & was managed by the two-year system
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges
(SACSCOC) Member and Candidate List (July 2016); Council on
Occupational Education (COE) Membership Directory (June 2016)
Factor variable indicating whether an institution is a Technical College,
Community College, or Junior College during that specific academic
year.
Regional Median Income
lnreg_income
2008 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates, United States
Bureau: ACS_08_3YR_B19013 & 2014 American Community Survey 5Year Estimates, United States Census Bureau: ACS_09_5YR_B19013;
ACS_10_5YR_B19013; ACS_11_5YR_B19013; ACS_12_5YR_B19013;
ACS_13_5YR_B19013; ACS14_5YR_B19013 & 2015 American
Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, United States Bureau:
ACS_15_1YR_B19013
Log of the estimated regional median household income represented in
2015 constant dollars. Regional represents the parish with the greatest
level of enrollment at the institution during the academic year.
Regional White Population Rate
reg_white%

Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:
Variable:
Variable Name:
Variable Labels:

Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:
Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:

Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
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Data Source &
Tables:

Definition:

Variable:
Variable Name:
Data Source &
Tables:
Definition:

2008 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates Public Use
Microdata Samples, United States Census Bureau; CC-EST20096RACE-22; 2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates Public
Use Microdata Samples, United States Census Bureau; CC-EST2015ALLDATA-22
Estimated total of white regional residents divided by the estimated total
of regional residents. Regional represents the parish with the greatest
level of enrollment at the institution during the academic year.
Regional Performance Score
zreg_score
Louisiana Department of Education
Regional school district performance score. Regional represents the
parish with the greatest level of enrollment at the institution during the
academic year. Standardized per academic year as measurement
changed in 2012.
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Appendix B: Supplemental Graphs
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Appendix C: Supplemental Tables
Supplemental Table 1: In-state Tuition & Fees for Louisiana Public Colleges in 2015 Inflation Adjusted Dollars
Institution

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

%
Change

Baton Rouge Community College
Bossier Parish Community College
Capital Area Technical College
Central Louisiana Technical Community College
Delgado Community College
Fletcher Technical Community College
Grambling State University
Louisiana State University
Louisiana State University-Alexandria
Louisiana State University-Eunice
Louisiana State University-Shreveport
Louisiana Tech University
McNeese State University
Nicholls State University
Northshore Technical Community College
Northwest Louisiana Technical College
Northwestern State University of Louisiana
Nunez Community College
River Parishes Community College
South Central Louisiana Technical College
South Louisiana Community College
Southeastern Louisiana University
Southern University and A & M College
Southern University at New Orleans
Southern University at Shreveport
SOWELA Technical Community College
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
University of Louisiana at Monroe
University of New Orleans

1972
1938
1052
1009
2143
1629
3987
5001
3478
2439
3875
5039
3591
3958
1008
865
3884
1949
2063
843
2050
3920
4036
3270
2479
1607
3745
3971
4386

2081
2042
1098
1055
2151
1715
4203
5619
3735
2562
3907
5563
3781
4034
1054
910
3975
2053
2150
888
2139
4111
4315
3281
2561
1670
3948
4188
4664

2107
2109
1124
1082
2680
1765
4365
5688
3873
2500
4058
5674
3899
4310
1080
939
4274
2120
2189
1048
2200
4274
4457
3339
2678
1722
4365
4145
4693

2607
2044
1245
1183
3114
2205
4666
6073
4021
2622
4346
5843
4201
4522
1239
1182
4619
2156
2333
1151
2373
4215
4830
3540
2877
2431
4664
4885
5015

2924
2738
1553
1522
3438
2655
5044
6559
4321
2831
4639
6087
4525
4890
1999
1542
5133
2690
2552
1511
2686
4753
5238
4032
3093
2686
5021
5266
5383

3145
2962
1975
1456
3043
2881
5365
7111
4697
2869
5029
6689
5177
5778
2935
2300
5576
2925
2852
1934
2911
5333
5913
4448
3362
2921
5468
5538
5952

3370
3296
3140
1449
3306
3246
5957
7882
5343
3202
5613
7311
5708
6476
3270
2632
6253
3260
3236
2102
3155
5722
6638
4856
3496
3247
6199
6325
6586

3693
3616
3693
1783
3625
3596
6525
8750
6009
3522
6168
8052
6334
7234
3580
2566
6786
3590
3556
2414
3581
6547
6630
4752
3634
3662
6872
6963
7392

87%
87%
251%
77%
69%
121%
64%
75%
73%
44%
59%
60%
76%
83%
255%
197%
75%
84%
72%
186%
75%
67%
64%
45%
47%
128%
83%
75%
69%

Source: Integrated Post-Secondary Data System
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Supplemental Table 2: Two-Year Institutions Not Meeting Minimum GRAD Act Requirements
Institution

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Acadiana Technical College*
Baton Rouge Community College

X

Bossier Parish Community College
Capital Area Technical College**
Central Louisiana Technical Community College
Delgado Community College
Fletcher Technical Community College
Louisiana Delta Community College
Louisiana State University-Eunice

X

Northeast Louisiana Technical College*
Northshore Technical Community College
Northwest Louisiana Technical College
Nunez Community College
River Parishes Community College
South Central Louisiana Technical College
South Louisiana Community College
Southern University at Shreveport

X

X

X

SOWELA Technical Community College
Source: Louisiana Board of Regents
*In 2013 Acadiana Technical College and Northeast Louisiana Technical College were merged with
South Louisiana Community College and Louisiana Delta Community College, respectively so were not
evaluated separately in 2013, 2014, 2015, & 2016. **In 2014 Capital Area Technical College merged with
Baton Rouge Community College so was not evaluated separately in 2014, 2015, & 2016.
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